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	<title>Comments on: Epiphenomenalism as an Objection to Several Philosophical Ideas</title>
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	<link>http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/</link>
	<description>In search of questions</description>
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		<title>By: doctor(logic)</title>
		<link>http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-566</link>
		<dc:creator>doctor(logic)</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Jul 2006 15:19:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-566</guid>
		<description>Bravo!

I think your post is basically on the right track, but it needs a bit of refinement.

Our minimal assumptions are that the world is consistent (so logic is useful) and at least partially structured (induction works, some detectable laws apply).  These assumptions appear to underlie everything we know, from the proofs of mathematics, to the fact that rocks roll downhill.  Why should long division always give us the same result?  This, too, is induction.

Thus, it seems that there is no knowledge that is not predictive in some way.  It follows that knowledge is justified by evidence of its corresponding prediction.  That&#039;s where causality comes in.  Induction assumes that there are detectable, causal connections between events.

Apply this criteria to our knowledge of the meaning of propositions.  What you&#039;ll find is that propositions that are free of prediction have infinite uncertainty in their meaning.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bravo!</p>
<p>I think your post is basically on the right track, but it needs a bit of refinement.</p>
<p>Our minimal assumptions are that the world is consistent (so logic is useful) and at least partially structured (induction works, some detectable laws apply).  These assumptions appear to underlie everything we know, from the proofs of mathematics, to the fact that rocks roll downhill.  Why should long division always give us the same result?  This, too, is induction.</p>
<p>Thus, it seems that there is no knowledge that is not predictive in some way.  It follows that knowledge is justified by evidence of its corresponding prediction.  That&#8217;s where causality comes in.  Induction assumes that there are detectable, causal connections between events.</p>
<p>Apply this criteria to our knowledge of the meaning of propositions.  What you&#8217;ll find is that propositions that are free of prediction have infinite uncertainty in their meaning.</p>
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		<title>By: Abyss</title>
		<link>http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-287</link>
		<dc:creator>Abyss</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 17 Jun 2006 00:57:03 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Perhaps I don&#039;t understand induction.  My idea of collecting data is information stored to search for correlations.  When a correlation is found (e.g., force between masses varys as the inverse square of the distance), then one has discovered a pattern or relationship.  But a law of Nature is much deeper and fundamental, and reveals an explanation of the phenomen and predicts new phenomenon.

There is a correlation between milk consumption and low cancer rates.  But there is no inductive law here, only many levels of secondary correlations (higher milk consumption in the 1st world, which has better health care and therefore lower cancer rates)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Perhaps I don&#8217;t understand induction.  My idea of collecting data is information stored to search for correlations.  When a correlation is found (e.g., force between masses varys as the inverse square of the distance), then one has discovered a pattern or relationship.  But a law of Nature is much deeper and fundamental, and reveals an explanation of the phenomen and predicts new phenomenon.</p>
<p>There is a correlation between milk consumption and low cancer rates.  But there is no inductive law here, only many levels of secondary correlations (higher milk consumption in the 1st world, which has better health care and therefore lower cancer rates)</p>
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		<title>By: catquas</title>
		<link>http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-280</link>
		<dc:creator>catquas</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Jun 2006 14:01:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-280</guid>
		<description>Abyss -

Collecting data to create laws about the universe is called induction. Without induction I cannot really collect data even, because for all I know what I just observed ceased to be the case the minute I stopped seeing it. Without induction the only thing I can know is what I am experiencing this second. Furthermore, Occam&#039;s Razor and induction are strongly tied to each other; Occam&#039;s Razor cannot be proved through deductive logic alone, as there is nothing contradictary about not believing it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Abyss -</p>
<p>Collecting data to create laws about the universe is called induction. Without induction I cannot really collect data even, because for all I know what I just observed ceased to be the case the minute I stopped seeing it. Without induction the only thing I can know is what I am experiencing this second. Furthermore, Occam&#8217;s Razor and induction are strongly tied to each other; Occam&#8217;s Razor cannot be proved through deductive logic alone, as there is nothing contradictary about not believing it.</p>
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		<title>By: Abyss</title>
		<link>http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-261</link>
		<dc:creator>Abyss</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Jun 2006 23:09:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-261</guid>
		<description>We, of course, begin our search for laws of Nature in an empirical sense, i.e. we collect data.  But as frameworks are developed (in a rigid mathematical way), then empirical data merely guides our development.  The data become tests of our framework and can only serve to disprove ideas rather than form independent relationships (always assuming that reality is correct and our framework needs correction when in conflict with observations).  Certainly there are mathematical frameworks that are imaginary (like Flatland), which can be logically consistent, but in the end disagree with observation or are simply incomplete (or Universe is not 2D, for example)

It would be contradictory for mass to not attract mass as it would violate the symmetry of space and time.  One could construct a framework where this is not the case, but you would begin to involve a large number of hypothesis that would force an Occum&#039;s Razor choice between this new framework and the old one.  This is primarly why new phenmenon is so exicting as it leads to new frameworks!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We, of course, begin our search for laws of Nature in an empirical sense, i.e. we collect data.  But as frameworks are developed (in a rigid mathematical way), then empirical data merely guides our development.  The data become tests of our framework and can only serve to disprove ideas rather than form independent relationships (always assuming that reality is correct and our framework needs correction when in conflict with observations).  Certainly there are mathematical frameworks that are imaginary (like Flatland), which can be logically consistent, but in the end disagree with observation or are simply incomplete (or Universe is not 2D, for example)</p>
<p>It would be contradictory for mass to not attract mass as it would violate the symmetry of space and time.  One could construct a framework where this is not the case, but you would begin to involve a large number of hypothesis that would force an Occum&#8217;s Razor choice between this new framework and the old one.  This is primarly why new phenmenon is so exicting as it leads to new frameworks!</p>
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		<title>By: catquas</title>
		<link>http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-255</link>
		<dc:creator>catquas</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Jun 2006 16:36:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-255</guid>
		<description>&lt;i&gt;Oops, my last comment came out all wrong. Here is how it was supposed to be:&lt;/i&gt;

Carl said what I was going to say. Your response to Carl is: &quot;For example I am certain about the applicability of Newton’s laws, even into the future, but I don’t have knowledge of their future correctness.&quot;

I’m not sure what this means. My point is that all knowledge is either assumed to be true (unfalsifiable), true by definition (deductive logic, unfalsifiable), or true given the truth of induction (induction is an unfalsifiable assumption). So by your definition I would say nothing is knowledge.

Abyss:

How are Newtonian laws deduced? If there is no induction necessary, and only deduction, they must follow from the law of non-contradiction in some way. How would it be contradictary for mass not to attract mass? Doesn’t a mathemetical framework require real-world data to become meaningful? How can we determine whether something is a fundamental symetry in the universe without making observations, and using induction to formalize those observations?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>Oops, my last comment came out all wrong. Here is how it was supposed to be:</i></p>
<p>Carl said what I was going to say. Your response to Carl is: &#8220;For example I am certain about the applicability of Newton’s laws, even into the future, but I don’t have knowledge of their future correctness.&#8221;</p>
<p>I’m not sure what this means. My point is that all knowledge is either assumed to be true (unfalsifiable), true by definition (deductive logic, unfalsifiable), or true given the truth of induction (induction is an unfalsifiable assumption). So by your definition I would say nothing is knowledge.</p>
<p>Abyss:</p>
<p>How are Newtonian laws deduced? If there is no induction necessary, and only deduction, they must follow from the law of non-contradiction in some way. How would it be contradictary for mass not to attract mass? Doesn’t a mathemetical framework require real-world data to become meaningful? How can we determine whether something is a fundamental symetry in the universe without making observations, and using induction to formalize those observations?</p>
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		<title>By: Carl</title>
		<link>http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-251</link>
		<dc:creator>Carl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Jun 2006 13:51:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-251</guid>
		<description>I suspect that Abyss is confusing the mathematical logicality of calculus with the applicability of calculus to the real world. Yes, if you accept the Euclidean universe and mathematical logic, then Newton&#039;s formulas for accleration and the like follow logically. However, the universe isn&#039;t Euclidean. 

On top of that, I would say that if you really really want to doubt the certainty of mathematical logic, there&#039;s nothing anyone can do to stop that person (though I suggest that it&#039;s probably better not to).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I suspect that Abyss is confusing the mathematical logicality of calculus with the applicability of calculus to the real world. Yes, if you accept the Euclidean universe and mathematical logic, then Newton&#8217;s formulas for accleration and the like follow logically. However, the universe isn&#8217;t Euclidean. </p>
<p>On top of that, I would say that if you really really want to doubt the certainty of mathematical logic, there&#8217;s nothing anyone can do to stop that person (though I suggest that it&#8217;s probably better not to).</p>
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		<title>By: catquas</title>
		<link>http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-250</link>
		<dc:creator>catquas</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Jun 2006 13:02:32 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Peter -

Carl said what I was going to say.

Your response to Carl is:
&lt;blockquote cite=&quot;For example I am certain about the applicability of Newton’s laws, even into the future, but I don’t have knowledge of their future correctness.&quot;&gt;

I&#039;m not sure what this means. My point is that all knowledge is either assumed to be true (unfalsifiable), true by definition (deductive logic, unfalsifiable), or true given the truth of induction (induction is an unfalsifiable assumption). So by your definition I would say nothing is knowledge.

Abyss:

How are Newtonian laws deduced? If there is no induction necessary, and only deduction, they must follow from the law of non-contradiction in some way. How would it be contradictary for mass not to attract mass? Doesn&#039;t a mathemetical framework require real-world data to become meaningful? How can we determine whether something is a fundamental symetry in the universe without making observations, and using induction to formalize those observations?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Peter -</p>
<p>Carl said what I was going to say.</p>
<p>Your response to Carl is:</p>
<blockquote cite="For example I am certain about the applicability of Newton’s laws, even into the future, but I don’t have knowledge of their future correctness.">
<p>I&#8217;m not sure what this means. My point is that all knowledge is either assumed to be true (unfalsifiable), true by definition (deductive logic, unfalsifiable), or true given the truth of induction (induction is an unfalsifiable assumption). So by your definition I would say nothing is knowledge.</p>
<p>Abyss:</p>
<p>How are Newtonian laws deduced? If there is no induction necessary, and only deduction, they must follow from the law of non-contradiction in some way. How would it be contradictary for mass not to attract mass? Doesn&#8217;t a mathemetical framework require real-world data to become meaningful? How can we determine whether something is a fundamental symetry in the universe without making observations, and using induction to formalize those observations?</p></blockquote>
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		<title>By: Abyss</title>
		<link>http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-244</link>
		<dc:creator>Abyss</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Jun 2006 03:06:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-244</guid>
		<description>Newtonian laws are not based on induction, they are a mathematical framework that has the force of deduction behind them.  The application of Newton&#039;s laws has inductive elements (&quot;will this hammer fall&quot;, &quot;will it fall again&quot;), but the relationships themselves are based on symmetries to the Universe that are fundamental.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Newtonian laws are not based on induction, they are a mathematical framework that has the force of deduction behind them.  The application of Newton&#8217;s laws has inductive elements (&#8220;will this hammer fall&#8221;, &#8220;will it fall again&#8221;), but the relationships themselves are based on symmetries to the Universe that are fundamental.</p>
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		<title>By: Peter</title>
		<link>http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-243</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Jun 2006 02:03:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-243</guid>
		<description>I think that some of this confusion is coming because I am not using knowledge in the colloquial sense, which is pretty standard in philosophy theories, but let me state things in yet another way.  We have beliefs.  Some of our beliefs we are certain about.  Some of the things we are certain about are knowledge (guaranteed to be true).  For example I am certain about the applicability of Newton’s laws, even into the future, but I don&#039;t have knowledge of their future correctness (I think this is what you were really asking about Carl).  The ability to have knowledge about something is a good indication of when that something is real / meaningful; even if in practice you rarely have the kind of knowledge under discussion here.  Basically if you have no way, even in principle, of being able to tell if a statement is true or false then it is epiphenomenal (this is the short version, quote only the full version from text), and thus I argue such statements should be discarded.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think that some of this confusion is coming because I am not using knowledge in the colloquial sense, which is pretty standard in philosophy theories, but let me state things in yet another way.  We have beliefs.  Some of our beliefs we are certain about.  Some of the things we are certain about are knowledge (guaranteed to be true).  For example I am certain about the applicability of Newton’s laws, even into the future, but I don&#8217;t have knowledge of their future correctness (I think this is what you were really asking about Carl).  The ability to have knowledge about something is a good indication of when that something is real / meaningful; even if in practice you rarely have the kind of knowledge under discussion here.  Basically if you have no way, even in principle, of being able to tell if a statement is true or false then it is epiphenomenal (this is the short version, quote only the full version from text), and thus I argue such statements should be discarded.</p>
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		<title>By: Peter</title>
		<link>http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/06/14/epiphenomenalism-as-an-objection-to-several-philosophical-ideas/#comment-242</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Jun 2006 01:05:36 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>In reference to observed situations obviously, sorry not to make myself clear.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In reference to observed situations obviously, sorry not to make myself clear.</p>
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