So sure, I agree that its not impossible for utilitarianism to be normative, I just judge the probability to be very low. If it was normative surely I should have feel some motivation to act so as to maximize total happiness (given that I have read utilitarian arguments) but I really don’t. Often I think that outcomes with less total happiness are better, and act to achieve them instead.

In any case, at least I’ve shown how it’s not totally incomprehensible how a non-egoist theory like utilitarianism could indeed turn out to be normative.

I’m willing to grant the internalist assumption that you have no reason to do what no amount of rational persuasion could ever convince you of. But if you are open-minded, it’s quite possible that discussion could bring you to revise your desire set so as to make it more internally coherent. You might come to see room for improvement in your current ends. If so, it seems clear that this counterfactual suffices to ground actual normative reasons — it’s a fact that counts in favour of your pursuing those (more ideal) ends.

Richard2- Yep, mathematical truths are arbitrary. There are other consistent logics, other geometries, etc. The ones we know best simple happen to be the most useful to us as tool for working with the world we know. I have discussed this elsewhere. For example: (http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/01/29/constructed-facts-and-philosophy/)

Carl- The second to last paragraph answers your question

The same is true about mathematics, but you don’t want to say that the mathematical truths were ‘made by us’ do you?

Really? You think that ‘normativity’ is synonymous with ‘self-interest’? That just seems linguistically false, as Moore’s open question argument demonstrates. The claim, “I have most reason to advance my own interests,” is not a tautology. (It’s quite disputable whether it’s even true!)

More plausibly, we have a primitive normative notion — perhaps “ought”, or “reasons”, or “ideality” — and then people dispute what this consists in (whether we ought, or have reason, or ideally would act in such-and-such a way). Many people assume, as you seem to in this post, that we ought (etc.) to advance our own interests. But this is a substantive claim, not a mere definitional stipulation, and it’s surely open to question. Utilitarians disagree with egoists about what we have reason to do; the dispute isn’t merely terminological (as it would be if they meant something different by the term ‘reason’).

“To start adding other things beyond our interests to that which we have reason to do is unacceptably arbitrary, and opens the door to adding anything we can think of (don’t go outside after 8), which is silly.”

Actually, the utilitarian position of taking everyone’s interests as reasons is arguably more coherent than egoism (which arbitrarily privileges a single person). Especially given that most people are not purely self-interested in the first place, and do in fact give *some* weight to the interests of, say, friends and family. (I develop this line of argument, here.)

As for your suggestion of a slippery slope from altruism to “anything we can think of”…. now that’s silly.