On Philosophy

June 14, 2006

Epiphenomenalism as an Objection to Several Philosophical Ideas

Filed under: Epistemology,Language,Ontology — Peter @ 12:13 am

1: What am I Talking About?

Usually epiphenomenal is used to describe a theory in which mental states exist but have no casual effect on the world. However in this article I am going to accuse other philosophical views, not necessarily about the mind, of being epiphenomenal. By this I mean that the objects that they propose to talk about do not have a casual effect on the universe. Without such a casual effect however we would have no way of knowing that they exist. Thus we should reject such ideas as being meaningless and un-provable. Of course these are broad claims, which require their own justification, so read on.

2: Knowledge and Causation

The background premise is that to know about something and to be able to meaningfully discuss it that thing must lie in your casual history. (Note: for the remainder of this article when I use the word meaning it is in the sense of meaningful. It is true that something that isn’t meaningful might have some private meaning to you, but it wouldn’t be justified to base a theory on it.) Of course to make a statement about casual history we must have defined causation first, so I suggest that you read the linked post if you have any questions about what counts as a cause for this argument. Another way of stating this premise is that to have knowledge of X there must be some time in the past in which I can say that X is a cause of my current mental state (my current knowledge). And of course for our words to have meaning we must have knowledge of the objects they propose to refer to. Now I am not saying that causation is all there is to meaning and knowledge (that story will have to wait until another time), I am simply saying that it is a necessary condition for meaning and knowledge.

(By knowledge I am referring to certain beliefs, as defined here)

An important caveat to make here is that not only must this causation exist but it must be discoverable as well. For example let us consider a possible world in which the disposition of objects to fall towards the ground is not caused by gravity but by the will of Odin. However Odin just happens to will things to fall if and only if gravity is present. People living in such a world will never be able to formulate laws involving the will of Odin, and thus as follows from my knowledge of causation post they will never think that Odin is the cause of anything. Assuming that Odin’s will is limited to making things fall they will then also never have knowledge of Odin’s will. Although they might speculate “what if the real reason things fell wasn’t gravity” they would have no way of knowing what it was, nor any evidence that it wasn’t gravity, and thus no way of knowing that it is Odin’s will.

Of course the obvious objection to the view that causation is required for knowledge is the question “what about fictional things?” It seems obvious that we have knowledge about Santa even though Santa, not being real, can never be a cause of any of my mental states. To this I would agree, and I think it shows that we don’t have knowledge of Santa, all we have is knowledge about what people have told us about Santa. To have knowledge of something implies that it is real, but what is real in this case is not Santa but the legends about Santa (they are real legends, in the sense that they exist, not that they are correct).

Does this imply then that because I have never seen the Eiffel tower that I have no knowledge of it? In a way, yes. I definitely have knowledge about pictures of the Eiffel tower, and what people have said about the tower. It is possible at least that these are all false, and thus absolute certain knowledge is impossible. However I reason thus: the most likely explanation for these pictures and descriptions is that a real Eiffel tower exists and is a cause of the pictures and explanations. Thus I feel warranted in acting as though I had knowledge of the Eiffel tower (as if it lay directly in my casual past, which it does), even though there is a minuscule possibility that it does not, and what I thought was knowledge about the Eiffel tower is really only knowledge about a complicated deception people have been playing on me. The meaning of words functions in much the same way. I use the words Eiffel tower as though I mean a real tower when all I really mean is a mental construct that has been formed by my knowledge of the tower (this is all that casually influences the words I speak, the real tower is not a cause of my speech; it can’t be it is too far away). It is possible that this mental construct is in error, or does not correspond to a real object. In this case the meaning of my words is a purely private matter, but if (as I reason is probable) other people have knowledge of the Eiffel tower as well they will have similar mental constructs, and the meaning of Eiffel tower to me will be nearly identical to the meaning of Eiffel tower to them, allowing us to communicate.

Let us propose a different objection then. Suppose that 2 million light years away there is a man called Darth Vader, who dresses all in black, ect. Now suppose we have watched a popular motion picture containing many details of what, by coincidence alone, happens to be this man’s life. Do we have knowledge of the “real” Darth Vader, even though there is no way that he could be the cause of this motion picture or the mental states that resulted from the motion picture? No, I would say that the casual link correctly tells us that we only have knowledge of the motion picture and not of the hypothetical “real” Darth Vader. Because even if Darth Vader was real it is equally possible that he isn’t real, but yet our knowledge of Darth Vader and his properties (such as his favorite color) is unchanged, he could even be popping in and out of existence as we speak, and our knowledge would remain the same. Thus since our knowledge can’t be affected by this “real” Darth Vader it seems baseless to say it is about him. On the other hand it makes perfect sense to say that it is about the fictional Darth Vader, for if somehow the movies were removed from time our knowledge would vanish with them.

Alright, enough about knowledge; if you still subscribe to a non-physical or magical theory of knowledge and meaning obviously the rest of this essay will sound hollow to you, and I apologize for that, but I have spent too long on meaning and knowledge as it is.

3: Epiphenomenal Ideas

Before we go on let me assert that the complete physical description of the universe is casually closed, by definition. Of course this isn’t true for our current physical description of the universe, as surely there are laws that haven’t been discovered yet. But, it is closed in principle because of how we decide what kind of information count as “physical”. For example let us pretend that the physical description wasn’t casually closed and that there was some non-physical force, Y, that had a casual effect on the physical world. If it has a casual effect then there is some physical system, X, that will produce result X-1 in the presence of Y and X-2 in the absence of Y. This behavior however is enough to postulate some physical cause, y, of X-1. A materialist could produce a detector for y using system X, and using this detector identify all of the ways in which Y had a casual effect on the world. This casual effect would be completely captured by y, which is part of the physical description. It is true that there may be more to Y than the physical properties captured by y. In this case we might argue that Y-y still exists and is non-physical. However Y-y has no casual effect on the world, and thus is epiphenomenal (because all the casual effects have been captured by the physical y).

Using this reasoning we can demonstrate that some forms of transcendental idealism are epiphenomenal. The form of transcendental idealism that I am referring to here is the belief that there are other aspects of reality that we have no access to, and that the aspects of reality we can perceive are in fact casually closed. Of course most philosophers who hold transcendental idealism to be true agree that we can have no knowledge about these other aspects of reality. However I would argue that if you can’t have any knowledge about it then you certainly can’t know that it exists. Thus I would argue that we should reject transcendental idealism because it is epiphenomenal; even if it were factual it can’t be known to be true, it can’t be detected, and it can’t effect us, so we might as well treat it as though it were false. Likewise when we have accepted that the physical description of the universe is casually closed we should reject dualism as epiphenomenal for the same reasons

The more interesting case though is ontology. There are two basic kinds of ontological claims. The weaker claim is that there are certain categories that we can impose on the world or that we can’t help but impose on the world. (By impose I mean that we can describe the world consistently with these divisions, and possibly argue from them.) On the other hand we have the stronger kind of ontological claim which states that reality is really divided into categories, in the sense that these divisions are part of the structure of reality, and are not in any way dependant upon people’s descriptions or thoughts. However, even if there were “real divisions” they would be epiphenomenal. For example you might think that there is a “real division” between objects under acceleration and objects in constant motion. Certainly an object cannot both be in constant motion and under acceleration. The category itself however does not have a casual effect on the world. Acceleration does, but the category is separate from acceleration, we simply use our observations on acceleration to determine which objects belong to the category. To look at it another way we might ask “what would change if the category of accelerated objects existed only in our minds?” The answer is that nothing would change. Individual objects would still accelerate and be subject to relativity even if the category dividing them from objects that were not under acceleration was only in our minds; the properties are real, but the category is not. From this I conclude that strong ontological claims are epiphenomenal, we have no way of knowing about them since they don’t have a casual effect on the world.

4: Conclusion

Someone who held one of these epiphenomenal views might now say to me “Yes, you have demonstrated that we cannot have knowledge about their contents, but neither have you demonstrated them to be false.” Well, since their contents have no casual effect on the world it is impossible to demonstrate their falsehood (except possibly through inconsistency). However because they are epiphenomenal I think that they are empty claims. Since we have no reason to believe them, and they can’t add anything meaningful to our understanding of the universe, I think that they should be discarded, even if they can’t be disproved.

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23 Comments

  1. There’s an easier way to say that you don’t really know about Vader. Take it back to Plato: “Knowledge is a true, justified belief.”

    We aren’t justified in believing in fictional movies, so we don’t actually have knowledge of Vader.

    Comment by Carl — June 14, 2006 @ 1:55 am

  2. What about the induction though? It is impossible for an event/object in the future to have caused my present mental state, so given your argument the implication is that we cannot know anything about the future.

    Comment by catquas — June 14, 2006 @ 4:49 am

  3. Knowledge as “true justified belief” has been rejected for several decades. I forget at the moment just who made the decisive objections, but I’ll post it when I remember it.
    We do know nothing about the future, but we can guess. Remember the problem of induction. To have knowledge of the future would be to say that we could never be wrong in our predictions, and that would definitely be false.

    Comment by Peter — June 14, 2006 @ 6:59 am

  4. Peter —

    I don’t know where to begin, so I’ll just cherry pick. There are doubtless other holes gaping just as large in the areas I fail to address:

    For example let us consider a possible world in which the disposition of objects to fall towards the ground is not caused by gravity but by the will of Odin. However Odin just happens to will things to fall if and only if gravity is present. People living in such a world will never be able to formulate laws involving the will of Odin, and thus as follows from my knowledge of causation post they will never think that Odin is the cause of anything. Assuming that Odin’s will is limited to making things fall they will then also never have knowledge of Odin’s will. Although they might speculate “what if the real reason things fell wasn’t gravity” they would have no way of knowing what it was, nor any evidence that it wasn’t gravity, and thus no way of knowing that it is Odin’s will.

    By exactly this chain of reasoning, you must therefore claim we could know nothing about gravity, or even formulate laws involving it (just switch “Odin’s will” for “gravity” in all cases).

    If you’re really ambitious, you could use it to sweep away all general laws (including yours about observation and knowledge, as opposed to the Muses and knowledge). But I wouldn’t bother, because under your rules knowledge isn’t going to survive past the end of this comment.

    Before we go on let me assert that the complete physical description of the universe is casually closed, by definition.

    Then you are not defining the universe we live in. The “everything can be deduced from general laws and initial conditions” view of the universe has been dead for going on eighty years. It simply doesn’t fit the facts.

    We do know nothing about the future, but we can guess. Remember the problem of induction. To have knowledge of the future would be to say that we could never be wrong in our predictions, and that would definitely be false.

    Therefore, all knowledge is impossible. Since you seem to have problems pushing things through to their logical conclusions, I’ll spell it out.

    You gave me:

    * To have knowledge about X implies that we are never wrong in our predictions about X

    * We know nothing about the future

    I observe that:

    * Our predictions about the past are frequently wrong

    And deduce (by your same reasoning):

    * We know nothing about the past

    Now, from the fact that the speed at which information propagates is finite, I can also conclude:

    * We know nothing about the present (since by the time information gets to us, the event in question is the past)

    —————————————

    I could go on, but (in the absence of general rules and given the impossibility of specific knowledge) it would be gilding the…or wait, I guess there aren’t any of those, either, are there? *sigh* I guess it’s time to go cleanm my vat.

    –MarkusQ

    Comment by MarkusQ — June 14, 2006 @ 8:03 am

  5. I found it, it was Ramsey who argued against it. An excellent article here. And yes under Ramsey’s account you can’t have knowledge without a casual link, although he doesn’t directly argue for it as I do.

    Comment by Peter — June 14, 2006 @ 9:27 am

  6. Assume for a moment I was wrong, and that it was possible to know things without any casual connection between me and the thing I claim I have knowledge of. It would then be possible to claim knowledge of anything you liked, and no one would be able to dispute your claim. For example “there are aliens in the andromeda galaxy who love my taste in clothing”. If a casual link isn’t necessary then there is little reason not to accept such claims; you certainly can’t disprove them. It might be true, I certainly believe it, and if causation isn’t required I can certainly justify it (intuition!).

    Comment by Peter — June 14, 2006 @ 9:45 am

  7. Last time I checked we don’t make predictions about the past, we simply observe it. We make wrong deductions about the past; that is a result of insufficient information, the information we needed was not part of our casual history, just as I have argued.

    I used the word “prediction” (mimicking you) to make a point, which you obviously missed. What you are calling “predictions” about the future are no different (logically speaking) than what you are calling “deductions” about the past. I was parodying your argument in order to point out how silly it was. To turn it back around, if you will accept that we can have knowledge about the past (even though we may make wrong deductions) you can’t rule out knowledge about the future on exactly the same grounds. If you do, you rule out all knowledge, by the very fact that all of it is extrapolated from our present mental state.

    And, to put a finer point on it, people very frequently do err in their deductions about the past.

    Assume for a moment I was wrong, and that it was possible to know things without any casual connection between me and the thing I claim I have knowledge of. It would then be possible to claim knowledge of anything you liked, and no one would be able to dispute your claim.

    You keep making absolute statements with obvious counter examples. It indicates (to me at least) that you aren’t thinking about what you’re saying, just regurgitating something you’ve read.

    Here, for example, your conclusion only follows if you blindly assume (as you apparently do) that causal connections are the only possible constraint on knowledge, and throwing this out leaves the box empty. For example, rather than requiring knowledge to be caused by observation, one might simply require it to be consistent with observation, apply parsimony constraints, etc. You don’t have to settle on one of these alternatives to see that they exist, and therefore dispensing with your precious causality constraint will not have the effect you claim.

    To really make headway, though, you need to let go of this obsession with nailing down meaning “in” the words. If you insist on defining the word “knowledge” as tightly as I suspect you want to, you will find that in the end you have squeezed your fist so tight that there isn’t a speck of sand left in it.

    As for prescribing Popper, I might suggest that you do the same. Also, Weinbergs “An Introduction to General Systems Thinking”–specifically, the principle of indifference, which I was employing here. Since we do not understand either gravity or Odin’s will in any fundamental sense, and (as with all language) employ arbitrary labels to discuss them, you should be very suspicious when an arbitrary reordering of these arbitrary labels changes your shopping of the validity of an argument.

    There’s no need to read the links and think more carefully about philosophy to see that the argument you posted here could be applied just as well in reverse, producing contradictory conclusions, and is therefore invalid (on the normal assumption that anything that could be used to simultaneously prove A and !A is more than a tad suspect).

    –MarkusQ

    Comment by MarkusQ — June 14, 2006 @ 11:42 am

  8. I used the word “prediction” (mimicking you) to make a point, which you obviously missed. What you are calling “predictions” about the future are no different (logically speaking) than what you are calling “deductions” about the past.

    No, statements about the past and future have completely different logical structures, and reasons for believing them to be true. Once again refer to my causation post and to the work of Popper.

    Comment by Peter — June 14, 2006 @ 12:13 pm

  9. Peter –

    I agree with Markus in that debates about knowledge can get into semantics. Since knowledge is a property of belief, I’ll talk about three properties of a belief which might get at what the idea of “knowledge” attempts to get out.

    First, a belief may be true or false. Second, a belief may be strong weak. Third, a belief may be supported by logic or not.

    I think it is obvious your argument does not apply to the first two. A belief may be true or false regardless of how it was caused. It also may be strong or weak regardless of this. So then there is the question of whether being supported by logic has anything to do with how the belief was caused.

    Here is a possible claim: It is illogical to believe something unless you believe that in the absense of the existence of that thing you would not have been caused to believe in it. I don’t think this is true either. If I take a scientific poll of a population I will get a certain ratio of “yes”es to “no”s, and I will expect that ratio to hold for the entire population. If I find that 90% of people say “yes”, and ask the pool question of someone from this population who I have not polled, I will have a logical reason to believe he also will say “yes”. But in no way has he caused this belief. This belief is justifed through induction.

    So if you have an idea of “knowledge” which involves more than the strength, truth, or rationality of a belief, my argument might not apply to it. Otherwise, I think it does.

    Comment by catquas — June 14, 2006 @ 12:20 pm

  10. Then what you mean when you say knowledge and what I mean when I say knowledge are two different things. Knowledge in this context is something that it is possible to be certain of. I then argue that certain knowledge requires a casual involvement, and as a result this should give us a reason to think that some statements illogical even if they can’t be disproved even in principle.

    Comment by Peter — June 14, 2006 @ 1:13 pm

  11. And before you ask it, let me get the next question as well: “what is your criterion for being certain of something?” I think generally a slight modification of Wittgenstein’s criteria is the most acceptable: to be certain of something you must have evidence for it, it must be possible to be falsified, so far no evidence against it has been found.

    Comment by Peter — June 14, 2006 @ 1:52 pm

  12. If knowledge is something to do with the certainty of belief, then I have addressed that. If it has something to do with logic, I think I addressed that. If it has something to do with your casual involvement argument, then your argument is circular.

    What you do say is that knowledge is something it is “possible to be certain of.” I’m not quite sure what that means (it is possible to be certain of any coherent proposition), but I think you mean which it is logical to be certain of. That combines certainly of belief and rationality of belief, which are two properties of belief I addressed.

    You imply that it is irrational to believe something with certainty which is not falsifiable, which has evidence for it, and which has no evidence against it. If this is true, I think you can be certain of nothing. Anything which is deductively proven is true by definition, and therefore not falsifiable. The same with anything which is assumed to be true. That leaves things which are inductively proven, but in order for you to believe any inductive argument you must have already assumed that induction works. But the assumption that induction works is not allowed to result in a certain belief because it is not falsifiable. If you are going to accept evidence for a proposition based on induction, you are thus basing this evidence on an uncertain belief. But how can you be certain about a conclusion if you are not certain about one of the premises?

    Comment by catquas — June 14, 2006 @ 3:35 pm

  13. Knowledge, as it is being used here, is more than belief. It is belief that I have rational reason to think is certain. There is no rational way in which you can know about something without in someway having evidence. However to know about the evidence it must have been both generated by the object in question (casually) and somehow you must have become aware of it (also casual).

    As to what you can be certain of: Newton’s laws as applied to macroscopic objects within certain degrees of error. They have been relentlessly confirmed and their ability to approximate well has never been falsified.

    Note you cannot know something based on induction (see Hume for a proof of this), but you can feel relatively sure of it. Although you may be confident (justifiably) it is not certain, since a prediction about the future cannot be falsified until the future is past, and thus it is not knowledge as we are using that term here. (for one reason among others, I can provide you with some more if you wish)

    Comment by Peter — June 14, 2006 @ 3:50 pm

  14. Huh? We can be certain of Newton’s laws, but we can’t be certain of something based on induction? Does not compute!

    Either you’re Hegel and you just used the dialect to prove that Newton’s laws must work, or you’re forgetting what you’re saying after just one paragraph.

    As far as I’m concerned, completely absolutely certainty is never justified, even for deduction. About deduction we can have strong certainty and about induction we can have varying degrees of weak certainty, but absolute certainty is impossible because certainty means “unable to be doubted,” but you can doubt whatever you want to doubt if you try hard enough.

    Comment by Carl — June 14, 2006 @ 5:39 pm

  15. In reference to observed situations obviously, sorry not to make myself clear.

    Comment by Peter — June 14, 2006 @ 6:05 pm

  16. I think that some of this confusion is coming because I am not using knowledge in the colloquial sense, which is pretty standard in philosophy theories, but let me state things in yet another way. We have beliefs. Some of our beliefs we are certain about. Some of the things we are certain about are knowledge (guaranteed to be true). For example I am certain about the applicability of Newton’s laws, even into the future, but I don’t have knowledge of their future correctness (I think this is what you were really asking about Carl). The ability to have knowledge about something is a good indication of when that something is real / meaningful; even if in practice you rarely have the kind of knowledge under discussion here. Basically if you have no way, even in principle, of being able to tell if a statement is true or false then it is epiphenomenal (this is the short version, quote only the full version from text), and thus I argue such statements should be discarded.

    Comment by Peter — June 14, 2006 @ 7:03 pm

  17. Newtonian laws are not based on induction, they are a mathematical framework that has the force of deduction behind them. The application of Newton’s laws has inductive elements (“will this hammer fall”, “will it fall again”), but the relationships themselves are based on symmetries to the Universe that are fundamental.

    Comment by Abyss — June 14, 2006 @ 8:06 pm

  18. Peter –

    Carl said what I was going to say.

    Your response to Carl is:

    I’m not sure what this means. My point is that all knowledge is either assumed to be true (unfalsifiable), true by definition (deductive logic, unfalsifiable), or true given the truth of induction (induction is an unfalsifiable assumption). So by your definition I would say nothing is knowledge.

    Abyss:

    How are Newtonian laws deduced? If there is no induction necessary, and only deduction, they must follow from the law of non-contradiction in some way. How would it be contradictary for mass not to attract mass? Doesn’t a mathemetical framework require real-world data to become meaningful? How can we determine whether something is a fundamental symetry in the universe without making observations, and using induction to formalize those observations?

    Comment by catquas — June 15, 2006 @ 6:02 am

  19. I suspect that Abyss is confusing the mathematical logicality of calculus with the applicability of calculus to the real world. Yes, if you accept the Euclidean universe and mathematical logic, then Newton’s formulas for accleration and the like follow logically. However, the universe isn’t Euclidean.

    On top of that, I would say that if you really really want to doubt the certainty of mathematical logic, there’s nothing anyone can do to stop that person (though I suggest that it’s probably better not to).

    Comment by Carl — June 15, 2006 @ 6:51 am

  20. Oops, my last comment came out all wrong. Here is how it was supposed to be:

    Carl said what I was going to say. Your response to Carl is: “For example I am certain about the applicability of Newton’s laws, even into the future, but I don’t have knowledge of their future correctness.”

    I’m not sure what this means. My point is that all knowledge is either assumed to be true (unfalsifiable), true by definition (deductive logic, unfalsifiable), or true given the truth of induction (induction is an unfalsifiable assumption). So by your definition I would say nothing is knowledge.

    Abyss:

    How are Newtonian laws deduced? If there is no induction necessary, and only deduction, they must follow from the law of non-contradiction in some way. How would it be contradictary for mass not to attract mass? Doesn’t a mathemetical framework require real-world data to become meaningful? How can we determine whether something is a fundamental symetry in the universe without making observations, and using induction to formalize those observations?

    Comment by catquas — June 15, 2006 @ 9:36 am

  21. We, of course, begin our search for laws of Nature in an empirical sense, i.e. we collect data. But as frameworks are developed (in a rigid mathematical way), then empirical data merely guides our development. The data become tests of our framework and can only serve to disprove ideas rather than form independent relationships (always assuming that reality is correct and our framework needs correction when in conflict with observations). Certainly there are mathematical frameworks that are imaginary (like Flatland), which can be logically consistent, but in the end disagree with observation or are simply incomplete (or Universe is not 2D, for example)

    It would be contradictory for mass to not attract mass as it would violate the symmetry of space and time. One could construct a framework where this is not the case, but you would begin to involve a large number of hypothesis that would force an Occum’s Razor choice between this new framework and the old one. This is primarly why new phenmenon is so exicting as it leads to new frameworks!

    Comment by Abyss — June 15, 2006 @ 4:09 pm

  22. Abyss –

    Collecting data to create laws about the universe is called induction. Without induction I cannot really collect data even, because for all I know what I just observed ceased to be the case the minute I stopped seeing it. Without induction the only thing I can know is what I am experiencing this second. Furthermore, Occam’s Razor and induction are strongly tied to each other; Occam’s Razor cannot be proved through deductive logic alone, as there is nothing contradictary about not believing it.

    Comment by catquas — June 16, 2006 @ 7:01 am

  23. Perhaps I don’t understand induction. My idea of collecting data is information stored to search for correlations. When a correlation is found (e.g., force between masses varys as the inverse square of the distance), then one has discovered a pattern or relationship. But a law of Nature is much deeper and fundamental, and reveals an explanation of the phenomen and predicts new phenomenon.

    There is a correlation between milk consumption and low cancer rates. But there is no inductive law here, only many levels of secondary correlations (higher milk consumption in the 1st world, which has better health care and therefore lower cancer rates)

    Comment by Abyss — June 16, 2006 @ 5:57 pm

  24. Bravo!

    I think your post is basically on the right track, but it needs a bit of refinement.

    Our minimal assumptions are that the world is consistent (so logic is useful) and at least partially structured (induction works, some detectable laws apply). These assumptions appear to underlie everything we know, from the proofs of mathematics, to the fact that rocks roll downhill. Why should long division always give us the same result? This, too, is induction.

    Thus, it seems that there is no knowledge that is not predictive in some way. It follows that knowledge is justified by evidence of its corresponding prediction. That’s where causality comes in. Induction assumes that there are detectable, causal connections between events.

    Apply this criteria to our knowledge of the meaning of propositions. What you’ll find is that propositions that are free of prediction have infinite uncertainty in their meaning.

    Comment by doctor(logic) — July 4, 2006 @ 8:19 am


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